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Resumo
Hoje em dia os elementos de rede (NEs) da camada 2 do modelo OSI,
bridges ou switches, são componentes complexos, com centenas demilhares
de linhas de código, que podem ser vulneráveis a ataques, permitindo até
a execçuão remota de código. Este trabalho tem como objectivo a criação
de um sistema para proteger infra-estruturas de rede Carrier Ethernet de
ataques lançados por NEs maliciosos contra o protocolo de gestão de lig-
ações, o Spanning Tree Protocol, e as sua variantes.
Na tese é proposto que os NEs sejam equipados com um componente
de detecção de intrusões. Cada um dos detectores utiliza um mecanismo
da detecção de intrusões baseada em especificacão e inspecciona o com-
portamento dos outros NEs através da análise das mensagens recebidas.
O comportamento correcto dos NEs é descrito tendo em conta a especifi-
cação normalizada do protocolo STP. Se existir um desvio entre um com-
portamento esperado e o actual, o NE é suspeito de ser malicioso. A es-
pecificação é estendida com anotações de padrões temporais, de modo a
detectar desvios do protocolo por parte dos NEs localmente. Os resul-
tados da detecção local nos NEs são enviados para os outros, para que
todos possam correlacionar a informação da detecção, diagnosticar quais
são os NEs maliciosos e logicamente removê-los da rede, desligando todas
as portas a eles ligadas.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Detecção Cooperativa de Intrusões, Detecção
de Intrsões baseada em especificação, Carrier Ethernet, Spanning Tree Pro-
tocol, Topologia da Rede, Segurança.
Abstract
Current OSI model layer 2 network elements (NEs, e.g., bridges, switches)
are complex hardware and software boxes, often running an operating
system, service and administration software, that can be vulnerable to at-
tacks, including to remote code execution inside them. The purpose of this
thesis is to present an architecture to protect the Carrier Ethernet network
infrastructure from attacks performed by malicious NEs against the link
management protocol, Spanning Tree Protocol, and its variations.
This thesis proposes that NEs are equipped with an intrusion detec-
tion component. Each detector uses a specification-based intrusion detec-
tion mechanism in order to inspect the behaviour of other NEs through
the analysis of the received messages. The correct behaviour of the NEs
is crafted from the standard specification of the STP protocol. If there is a
deviation between current and expected behaviour, then the NE is consid-
ered to be malicious. The specification is extended with temporal pattern
annotations, in order to detect certain deviations from the protocol. The
results of the local detection are then transmitted to the other NEs, in or-
der to cooperatively establish a correlation between all the NEs, so that
malicious NEs can be logically removed from the network (disconnecting
the ports connected to them).
KEYWORDS:Cooperative IntrusionDetection, Specification-based In-
trusionDetection, Carrier Ethernet, Spanning Tree Protocol, Network Topol-
ogy, Security.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The telecommunications industry, meeting the needs of an increasingly
global commerce environment, has contributed to better productivity and
bridged communities globally in almost every industrial segment. The re-
ality that current communication infrastructures are so efficient, is in no
small part due to standards developed by several international organiza-
tions. The standards that keep current networks efficient also pave the
way for next generation networks. However, while standards have con-
tinued to meet the end-users and industry needs, the increasing use of
open interfaces and protocols, the multiplicity of new actors, the sheer
diversity of applications and platforms, and implementations not always
sufficiently tested, have increased the opportunity for malicious usage of
networks. In recent years, a surge of denial of service attacks caused peri-
ods of unavailability in services and parts of the Internet, involving innu-
merable service providers and users, and often resulting in a major impact
in terms of costs [Turner(editor), 2006]. The question then is how does one
deploy an open communication network without letting it vulnerable to
these attacks. The answer is complex but a first requirement is clearly the
1
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protection of the communication infrastructure itself.
Layered network architectures, like the OSI and TCP/IP models, sep-
arate functionality in layers, where the lower layers provide services for
the higher layers. These flexible models provide a form of separation of
concerns, which allows the layers to be designed and implemented inde-
pendently. However, from the security point of view, once a lower layer is
compromised, the reliability of the higher layers can also be affected. Most
existing network security paradigms and models are concerned with the
layers from 3 to 7 of the OSI model, i.e., from the Network to the Appli-
cation layers. In Internet terms, this means security is mostly concerned
with protocols like IP, TCP, HTTP and SOAP, and issues like user authen-
tication, data integrity and confidentiality. Less attention has been paid to
the network infrastructure, i.e., to layer 1 and 2 protocols.
When layer 2 protocols are used on local trusted networks, their se-
curity is usually not critical. However, with the use of layer 2 protocols
over wide area networks, the assumption of their security is problematic.
As more and more broadband service providers deploy access networks
based exclusively on layer 2 protocols, attacks focused on the data link
layer becomemore feasible. Particularly, since home users will have access
to the network, they could attempt to manipulate the protocols to disrupt
service to other customers and the broadband service provider. Therefore,
the data link layer could be an attractive target for attackers, being the
lowest layer not requiring physical access to manipulate. Attacks against
these two layers can “disable” the network, causing unavailability of the
higher layer protocols, with a huge impact on a large-scale network, pos-
sibly involving a vast number of service providers and users.
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1.1 Objectives
The purpose of this work is to present an architecture to protect the
Carrier Ethernet network infrastructure using a cooperative distributed intru-
sion detection and response system. The motivation for this work is that this
kind of network technology is currently being widely adopted around the
world by Internet service providers and many other companies1. More
specifically, the thesis is about theOSI Data Link Layer (layer 2) [ISO, 1994],
its protocols and network elements (NEs), i.e., switches and bridges.
Currently, NEs are complex hardware and software boxes, often run-
ning an operating system, service and administration software. Therefore,
NEs can have vulnerabilities, which can be exploitable like the vulnerabil-
ities that are hacked everyday in the Internet, e.g., in Web or email servers
[Turner(editor), 2006]. For instance, several NEs from different manufac-
tures were disclosed a lot of vulnerabilities:
• The Cisco Catalyst family routers run the Cisco IOS software. A heap
buffer overflow vulnerability [Cisco, 2005a] that would allow remote
execution of code in some versions of IOS has been recently reported.
• The HP Procurve 4000M is a common, managed switch, which pro-
vides low-cost and scalable Ethernet switching. There exists at least
one vulnerability in the web administration interface that allows an
attacker to reset a switch, allowing the attacker to arbitrarily and re-
peatedly deny access to all switched ports [HP, 2002].
• The Avaya P330 Stackable Switch [Avaya, 2005] was found to have
a default password. An attacker could use this default password to
1The adoption of Carrier Ethernet is being pushed by the Metro Ethernet Forum. The site of
the forum is at: http://www.metroethernetforum.org
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gain remote access to such a switch.
In this thesis the interest focus on the problem of a layer 2 NE being
controlled by a hacker, starting to behave maliciously and launching at-
tacks against the network infrastructure. We consider the case of a net-
work formed by a set of NEs, some of which aremalicious. To deal with this
problem, it is proposed that NEs are equipped with a component which
provides network intrusion detection. Each of these detectors inspects the
behavior of other NEs by inspecting the messages received from them and
by cooperating with other detectors in other NEs to diagnose the attack
and (logically) remove the malicious NE from the network.
1.2 Contributions
The contribution of this thesis is the design of the first distributed net-
work intrusion detection system for carrier Ethernet. It focuses on the
original link management protocol of the (switched) Ethernet, the Span-
ning Tree Protocol (STP), and its variations, the Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol
(RSTP) and the Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol (MSTP), as a case study
[Cisco, 1997, IEEE, 1998b, Cisco, 2006b, Cisco, 2006a, IEEE, 1998c].
The detection follows a recent approach dubbed specification-based in-
trusion detection, which relies on a specification of the protocol to detect
deviations from it. However, this form of intrusion detection is normally
used to detect deviations from sequences of messages or state transitions
that should occur, while many attacks against STP have to do with cer-
tain patterns in terms of time behavior. Therefore, we have to extend the
usual specification-based intrusion detection schemewith time pattern an-
notations, in order to detect all known attacks against xSTP (STP and its
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variations).
The intrusion detection scheme works roughly as follows. The detec-
tors in the NEs inspect the STP protocol messages received in the NE
in real-time and without interfering with the operation of the network.
Whenever a message is received in a NE, the detector checks the behav-
ior of the NEs involved against their expected behavior. The correct be-
havior of the NEs is described following the STP protocol specification
[IEEE, 1998b]. If there is a deviation between expected and actual behav-
ior, the NE is suspected of being malicious and logically removed from the
network.
The results of the local detection in the NEs are sent to the other NEs,
so that all can correlate the detection information, diagnose which is (or
are) the malicious NE, and then disconnected it. A management network
currently used with carrier Ethernet networks by service providers (DCN)
is used to provide extra integrity and authentication support in the com-
munication of the detection information.
Besides xSTP, wemight also have considered other attacks in malicious
NEs, like discardingmessages or forwarding them to the wrong port/link.
However, these attacks are similar to those studied for malicious routers
at layer 3, and there is already a considerable literature about how to deal
with them, e.g., [Perlman, 1988, Mizrak et al., 2006, Lee et al., 2006]. Al-
though these mechanisms were designed to be applied at a different OSI
level, some of them can arguably be used at layer 2.
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1.3 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives some insight about
carrier Ethernet networks, the STP protocol, the attacks against this proto-
col, and current protections available against these attacks. Chapter 3 de-
scribes the proposed cooperative intrusion detection architecture. Chapter
4 presents experimental results. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the docu-
ment and presents some future work.
1.4 Achievement
Until the thesis submission date, this thesis has achieved two scientific
publications, one patent acceptance and one patent submission.
Publications:
• Pan Jieke, João Redol and Miguel Correia.
“Specification-Based Intrusion Detection System for Carrier Ether-
net”.
In 3rd International Conference on Web Information Systems and Tech-
nologies, Barcelona, Spain, March 2007
• Pan Jieke, João Redol and Miguel Correia.
“Detecção Cooperativa de Intrusões em Redes Carrier Ethernet”.
In 3a Conferência Nacional sobre Segurança Informática nas Organizações,
Lisboa, Portugal, November 2007
Patent:
• Pan Jieke and João Redol.
“Method for Protocol Behaviour Detection in Carrier Ethernet”,
Filed for patent office (level 4, 0-5), December 2007
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• Pan Jieke and João Redol.
“Integrated Network Security Architecture Monitoring System”,
Submitted for evaluation, September 2007
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Chapter 2
Related work
2.1 Carrier Grade Ethernet
Networking today comprises a wide range of technologies. Different
organizations have different requirements and the technologies are con-
stantly evolving, requiring constant adaptation and reconfiguration of the
systems. Therefore, it is important to have a reference model which de-
fines rules for the network infrastructure to deal with all this complex-
ity. The standard networking model is the Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) [ISO, 1994]. This model provides flexibility for network infrastruc-
ture construction and separation of functionality. Basically, it separates the
network functionality in components called layers, where each layer is as
independent of the others as possible.
There are seven layers in the OSI model. A lower layer provides ser-
vices for higher layers without having to reveal how these services are im-
plemented. This separation of concerns provides flexibility to the model,
allowing changes in lower layers (mostly) without affecting the users and
applications that rely in upper layers. This layering, however, causes that
9
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unreliability in a lower layer might compromise all layers above it.
The second layer of the OSI model – the Data Link Layer – stays be-
tween the Network Layer (layer 3) and the Physical Layer (layer 1). This
is the layer that transfers data between adjacent network nodes in a wide
area network or between nodes on the same local area network segment,
detecting and possibly correcting errors that may occur in the Physical
Layer.
Ethernet is currently the dominant layer 2 networking technology in
wired local area networks, for a set of reasons that are debatable but that
surely include its low cost, simple management and its constant evolu-
tion in terms of bandwidth provided [Metcalfe and Boggs, 1988]. Because
of the very competitive interface price per Mbps and high bandwidth
supported, many carriers are installing Ethernet-based networks as an al-
ternative to legacy ATM/SDH deployments, mainly in the access area.
With the advent of the Internet and strongly growing data services, packet-
switched networks, like IP/Ethernet networks, are better suited to satisfy
the needs of the carriers’ customers. Ethernet was not originally a carrier-
grade technology, because it was designed for LAN environments. How-
ever there are currently several efforts in standardization organizations,
like the IEEE, in order to adapt the Ethernet functionality to the needs of
carriers.
2.1.1 The problem
System administrators and developers normally assume that the Data
Link Layer is secure or, at least, are not concerned about its security. There
are several reasons for this situation: layer 2 bridges/switches have no
interface for human interaction, they are physically controlled by an orga-
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nization, their protocols (layer 2 only) and software are reasonably simple
when compared, for instance, with Web protocols and servers, and, more
importantly, the typical Internet hacker is several layer 2 networks away
from its target, so it needs layer 3 routing to reach the network. As Eth-
ernet becomes an access network solution in the carrier class, more and
more service providers deploy access to the network at layer 2, so attacks
focused on the data link layer become more feasible. As one of the most
commonly used Ethernet standard link management protocols, the Span-
ning Tree Protocol and its variations (RSTP and MSTP) are an obvious tar-
get for those attacks, which can compromise the security of all the layers
above 2 and the network availability.
2.2 Spanning Tree Protocol Family
LAN bridges/switches were first conceived and developed during the
mid-1980s as layer 2 switching devices supporting star-shaped networks,
instead of the original Ethernet bus architecture. In order to truly supplant
SONET/SDH with Ethernet in Metro networks, Ethernet must meet the
demanding standards service providers expect and rely upon from circuit-
based networks. These include high availability and fault tolerance in the
event of network or equipment failure. Given that Ethernet services are
most cost-effectively implemented on native Ethernet equipment, a vari-
ety of resiliency mechanisms have been introduced to Ethernet to enable
the construction of such a network. The result is an Ethernet-based Metro
network that is far more efficient and lower cost than SONET-based de-
ployments. The key to achieving high availability with Ethernet in the
Metro, however, is that the network is architected on a foundation of re-
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siliency.
When switched Ethernet appeared, there was some concern about re-
dundant connections between two or more switches, since they would
form loops and would cause the replication of some of the messages flow-
ing in the network. Therefore, the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) was de-
signed with the purpose of managing links, removing existing loops with-
out human intervention (Figure 2.1) [IEEE, 1998b]. Currently, STP ismostly
used for fault tolerance. Redundant connections are introduced in the net-
work on purpose and, if a link (i.e., a cable or interface) fails, STP recon-
figures the network to use a redundant link, thus ensuring the continuity
of service.
A tree topology is always loop-free, since there is one and only one
path from a leaf of the tree to any other of the leafs. The purpose of STP
is to organize the network in such a tree topology without leaving any
segment isolated, i.e., disconnected from the rest of the tree.
2.2.1 Root bridge
A tree has a root from which the remainder of the tree branches out.
The NE in the root of the spanning tree is called root bridge in STP. The
root bridge is the logical center of a network and there is only one root
bridge in each instantiation of the tree, i.e., between two reconfigurations
of the network performed by STP. Depending on the configuration, any
bridge can be the root bridge. The root bridge may change over time if
the topology changes, e.g., because a bridge is removed or added to the
network.
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Network with loop
Loop-free network
After
STP
Figure 2.1: Spanning Tree Protocol
2.2.2 Designated bridge
Preventing loops in the network means to ensure that there is one and
only one path from one bridge to another. A simple way to obtain this, is
by ensuring that only one bridge – the designated bridge – is responsible for
forwarding traffic from the direction of the root onto a given link. If there
is only one active path from the root to a link, then by definition there
are no loops in the topology. Each link has exactly one designated bridge,
which is one of the two bridges directly connected to that link. The root
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bridge is always the designated bridge for all links to which it is directly
connected. Non-root bridges may be the designated bridges for no links,
one link, or more than one link in the network. For instance, on the bottom
rectangle of Figure 2.1, the root bridge (on the top) is the designated bridge
for the 2 links to which it is connected; each of the 2 bridges below is the
designated bridge for the 2 links below it; the 4 bridges on the bottom are
not designated bridges for any link.
2.2.3 Designated Ports and Root Ports
For a given bridge, there are the following types of ports:
• Designated Port: is a port in the active topology used to forward traffic
away from the Root Bridge onto the link for which this bridge is the
Designated Bridge.
• Root Port: is a port in the active topology that provides connectivity
from the Designated Bridge towards the Root Bridge.
• All other ports of a bridgewill be inactive (disabled or blocked) in the
steady-state, i.e., when there are no reconfiguration of the topology
going on.
2.2.4 Bridge Identifiers and Port Identifiers
To configure, calculate and maintain the spanning tree, each bridge in
the network has a unique identifier. This bridge ID (Figure 2.2) is a 64-bit
value unique to each bridge. It is a concatenation of a 16-bit priority value
(high weight 16 bits) and a globally unique 48-bit which is the NE’s MAC
address (low weight 48 bits).
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MSByte LSByte
Bridge
Priority MAC Address 48-bit
Figure 2.2: Bridge Identifier
NEs use their physical network interfaces – ports – for connecting to
other NEs. Each port on a NE is assigned a port identifier (Figure 2.3),
similar to the bridge identifier. A port identifier is a concatenation of a
unique 8-bit port number with a configurable priority field. Port numbers
are locally unique to theNE, and simply denote the number of the physical
attachment on the NE. Each port connects to a link, which may connect to
another LAN bridge/switch, a wide area connection, or a computer.
MSByte LSByte
Port Priority Port NumberFigure 2.3: Port Identifier
2.2.5 Spanning Tree Calculation and Maintenance
STP attempts to configure the network such that every leaf is reachable
from the root through the path/link with the lowest cost determined by
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the data rate of each link. Therefore, the spanning tree topology for a
given set of links and bridges is determined by the bridge IDs, the link
costs, and the port identifiers associated with the bridges in the network.
STP has to perform three operations:
• determine a root bridge, which is the bridge with lowest bridge ID;
• determine the designated bridge for each link;
• maintain the topology over time.
In practice, all of these operations are done in parallel, through the
spanning tree algorithm operating identically and independently in each
bridge.
2.2.5.1 Root bridge election
The election algorithm of root bridge is simple: the bridge with the
numerically-lowest Bridge ID becomes the Root Bridge at a given time. A
change in a root bridge will cause the spanning tree to reconfigure such
that Root Bridge always has the lowest numbered Bridge ID.
The network administrator can control which bridge will be the default
root, and the order in which other bridges will assume root responsibility,
by manipulating the priority field in the Bridge ID. Since the priority field
constitutes the most significant bits of the Bridge ID, it always overrides
any effect of the remaining 48 bits for the identification.
2.2.5.2 Designated bridge election
Once there is a Root Bridge, it is necessary to identify, for each and
every link in the network, a single bridge responsible for forwarding traffic
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from the root to that link. This is the Designated Bridge for the link in
question. By definition, the Root Bridge is the Designated Bridge for every
link to which it attaches. The Designated Bridge for each other link will be
the bridge that offers the lowest cost path back to the root. The path cost
is simply the sum of the link costs over the path, with the link costs. Thus,
the spanning tree will be such that the highest capacity links are always
used, rather than diverting traffic needlessly through slower links.
It is possible that two bridges have the same path cost back to the root.
In the event of such a tie, the bridge with the lowest Bridge ID will become
the Designated Bridge. Similarly, it is possible that a Designated Bridge
can have two ports on the same link. Only one of the ports can be the
Designated Port for the link, the port with the lowest numbered Port ID
will be chosen.
2.2.5.3 Bridge Protocol Data Units
STP operates on the principle that all Designated Bridges advertise
their current understanding of the spanning tree and their internal state
by emitting, on a regular basis through their Designated Ports, a config-
uration message. STP’s configuration messages are called Bridge Protocol
Data Units (BPDUs) (Figure 2.4). BPDUs are used to learn about the exis-
tence of other bridges and to obtain the information needed to calculate
and maintain the spanning tree. There are four types of BPDUs definable
by the TC field in the BPDU:
• Configuration BPDU
• Topology Change Notification BPDU
• Topology Change Notification Acknowledge BPDU
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• Topology Change BPDU
Protocol Identifier
Protocol Version
BPDU Type
TCack Flag TC
Root Identifier
Root Path Cost
Bridge Identifier
Port Identifier
Message Age
Max Age
Hello Time
Forward Delay
Figure 2.4: BPDU format
2.2.5.4 Network topology maintenance
When the spanning tree has converged to the proper topology, the reg-
ular emission of Configuration BPDU maintains the topology, keeping in-
active bridges and ports from becoming active and creating undesirable
loops. In the event of a link or bridge failure, the lack of regular Con-
figuration BPDU from the now failed link or bridge may cause previously
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inactive bridges and ports to become active in order tomaintainmaximum
connectivity. The spanning tree topology will then reconverge to the best
topology now available.
In normal (steady state) operation, the protocol operates as follows:
1. Once every period designated byHello Time (typically 2 seconds), the
Root Bridge transmits a Configuration BPDU. The message indicates
that the sender is the Root Bridge (the Root ID will be the same as the
Bridge ID in the BPDU) and that the path cost to the root bridge is
zero (since it is being sent by the root itself).
2. All bridges sharing links with the Root Bridge receive the message
and pass it to the STP entity within the bridge.
3. Designated Bridges use the information received from the Root Brid-
ge to create a new Configuration BPDU, updating the values of the
Bridge ID, path cost, Port ID and other fields appropriately, finally
transmitting this message through each of its Designated Ports.
4. Similarly, bridges sharing the links with each of these Designated
Bridges receive this second tier message. As a result, the Designated
Bridges for the next tier in the tree will transmit new, modified mes-
sages through their own Designated Ports.
5. This process continues until there are no more Designated Bridges.
Once a spanning tree is determined and set in place, there is rarely any
need to change the topology. Topology changes only occur if:
• A designated or root bridge fails
• A designated or root port fails
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• An active link fails
• A bridge internal configuration changes (bridge priority, port prior-
ity change, etc)
• A new designated or root bridge is added
• A new link is added
When a bridge that is not the Root Bridge detects changes on the active
topology, it transmits a Topology Change BPDU through its Root Port.
This is repeated until the bridge receives an acknowledgment from the
Designated Bridge for that link. That Designated Bridge similarly trans-
mits a Topology Change Notification BPDU through its root port to the
next designated bridge, until the message reaches the Root Bridge.
When the Root Bridge is informed of the change, it sets the Topology
Change flag (TC) in all ConfigurationMessages transmitted for some time,
so that all bridges become aware of the topology change.
2.2.6 RSTP and MSTP
In 1998, IEEE 802.1w introduced an evolution of the Spanning Tree
Protocol, the Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (RSTP), which provides faster
spanning tree convergence after a topology change. Standard IEEE 802.1D-
2004 now defines RSTP and obsoletes STP [Cisco, 2006b].
RSTP is a refinement of STP and therefore shares most of its basic oper-
ation characteristics. However there are some notable differences as sum-
marized below:
• Faster aging of information: a bridge considers that it has lost con-
nectivity to its direct neighboring root or designated bridge if it mis-
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ses three consecutive BPDUs.
• Introduction of flags in the messages to describe fully port roles and
port states.
• After a change is detected, unwanted source address information is
purged from forwarding tables 1 without delay.
• Origination of Configuration Message BPDUs on a port by port ba-
sis, instead of transmission on Designated ports following reception
of information from the Root.
The Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol (MSTP), originally defined in IE-
EE 802.1s and later merged into IEEE 802.1Q-2003, defines an extension
to the RSTP protocol to further apply the loop-free mechanism in virtual
LANs (VLANs) [Cisco, 2006a, IEEE, 1998c]. This “Per-VLAN” Multiple
Spanning Tree Protocol configures a separate spanning tree for each VLAN
group and blocks the links that are redundant within each Spanning Tree.
2.2.7 STP Attacks
STP is a low level network link management protocol. A few charac-
teristics render it vulnerable to several types of attacks from hackers who
have direct physical access to the network equipment. These attacks use
the legitimate connection with network equipment to inject attacks in the
network. Recall that we say that a NE is malicious if it is controlled by a
hacker, thus can execute arbitrary attacks against the STP protocol.
1Every learning bridge keeps a mapping of ports and MAC addresses reachable through those
ports in a data structure known as the forwarding table.
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A careful analysis of the protocol and the literature on the matter, lead
us to conclude that the attacks possible against STP are essentially the fol-
low [Marro, 2003, Artemjev and Myasnyankin, 2003]:
• ID changing attacks
1. Priority value changing
Typically, the election of entities who participate in STP (the
root bridge or the designated bridge) is based on the bridge
IDs, which are composed by the bridge priority value andMAC
address. A malicious NE can force its election as Root or des-
ignated bridge by modifying (reducing) its priority value that
has the highest weight in the bridge ID, so that is becomes the
lowest bridge ID.
2. MAC spoofing
Although MAC spoofing does not permit a malicious NE to
force its election as root since the priority value has low weight
in the bridge ID, this attack can cause (undesirable) topology
changes.
• Silent attacks
– As STP is a self-managed protocol, when the network topology
is stable every NE continues sending Configuration BPDUs to
each other to indicate they are alive. A malicious NE can omit
sending these BPDUs to cause an undesirable network recon-
figuration. When executed repeatedly, this attack can impair
the availability of the network.
• Faked failure attacks
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– In STP, the failure of a NE is detected by its neighbors. When
a neighbor NE detects the failure, it sends a Topology Change
BPDU to indicate this event. A malicious NE might generate
fake Topology Change BPDUs to cause network reconfigura-
tions.
• BPDU flooding attacks
1. Flood of Topology Change BPDUs
A flood of bogus Topology Change BPDUs from different ad-
dresses is injected in the network, which can cause undesirable
network reconfigurations.
2. Flood of Topology Change Notification BPDUs
A flood of bogus Topology Change Notification BPDUs from
different addresses are injected in the network, causing unde-
sirable network reconfigurations.
3. Flood of Configuration BPDUs claiming root role
Configuration BPDUwith invalid bridge identifiers, claim to be
newNEs in the topology, possibly being elected as the new root.
• Invalid BPDU
– This attack consists in sending a BPDU that is malformed or that
could not be sent in the current state of the NE. This attack can
be, for instance, an attempt to find a vulnerability in the target
NE, which would allow remote code execution or would crash
the NE.
Notice that with exception of the last attack, all these are attacks against
the availability of the network infrastructure, i.e., denial of service attacks.
24 CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
The last attack, Invalid BPDU, can be used with other purposes, like doing
a buffer overflow attack against the NE software, in case there is corre-
sponding vulnerability.
2.2.8 STP attacks prevention
Several mechanisms can be used to mitigate attacks against STP. Marro
proposes the extension of STP with message authentication [Marro, 2003].
He assumes that the attacks are generated by clients (computers, non-NEs)
simulating they are legitimate NEs, so it does not consider the case of mali-
cious NEs, capable of generating valid message authentication codes. The
idea consists in the addition to each BPDU of a message authentication code
(MAC) [Menezes et al., 1997], obtained using symmetric encryption keys
shared by the NEs. When a legitimate bridge sends a BPDU, it will take
a valid MAC and, therefore be accepted by other bridges. If the BPDU is
sent by a NE that does not have the key(s), it will take an invalid MAC
so it will be refused by other NEs. In this work we assume NEs can be
malicious, so they might generate attacks with valid message authentica-
tion codes if that mechanism was used. Therefore that mechanism is not
enough to deal with some of the attacks considered in this thesis.
Cisco has proposed two features in their bridges/switches called BPDU
Guard [Cisco, 2005b] and ROOT Guard [Cisco, 2005c] that block the recep-
tion of BPDUs from non-STP ports, thus preventing attacks from clients.
BPDU Guard and ROOT Guard are similar, but their impact is different.
BPDUGuard simply disables the port upon a BPDU reception on that port,
and ROOT Guard allows the device to participate in STP as long as the de-
vice does not try to become the root. Once more, these mechanisms are not
enough to deal with some of the attacks considered in the thesis: attacks
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coming from malicious NEs.
The standard 802.1x protocol performs the authentication of users in a
IEEE 802 LAN, e.g., for dial-up connections [IEEE, 1998a]. A user needs
to make a request to a gateway that controls network access and forwards
requests to an authentication server, e.g., a RADIUS server. It can prevent
attacks from non-authenticated client computers simulating they are NEs,
like Marro’s scheme.
All of these solutions consider only that the clients connected to the
NEs can be malicious and assume NEs are always correct. On the other
hand, they have still many limitations. Marro’s approach has the limita-
tion of being difficult to implement in real systems, since it requires modi-
fying the STP protocol itself and putting a shared cryptographic key in all
NEs. The key distribution is non-trivial, especially because layer 2 NEs are
usually deployed without further configuration. Cisco’s solutions need
an initial static configuration, complicating the network administration.
802.1x has a potential high cost in terms of resources and administrative
overhead by using certificate-based authentication.
2.3 Intrusion Detection and STP
Security mechanisms like 802.1x access control [IEEE, 1998a] and fire-
walls have a fundamental role in network security but can not prevent all
possible attacks against a network. For instance, legitimate users are able
to perform attacks even if those mechanisms are properly used. Intru-
sion detection is a second line of defense [Denning and Neumann, 1985,
Porras et al., 1998, Kruegel et al., 2005]. The idea is to gather computer or
network data and analyze it looking for attacks or intrusions. Classically,
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an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) attempts to detect the presence or the
likelihood of all kinds intrusions. Intrusion detection can be performed in
real-time or off-line.
IDSs come in a variety of “flavors” and approach the goal of detecting
suspicious traffic in different ways. There are network based (NIDS) and
host based (HIDS) intrusion detection systems. There are IDSs that de-
tect based on looking for specific signatures of known threats, similarly to
the way anti-virus software typically detects and protects against malware
and there are IDSs that do detection based on comparing traffic patterns
against a baseline and looking for anomalies. There are IDSs that simply
monitor and alert and there are IDSs that perform an action or actions in
response to a detected threat.
From the point of view of where they are placed, IDSs can be:
• NIDS - Network Intrusion Detection Systems are placed at a strategic
point or points within the network to monitor traffic to and from all
devices on the network. Ideally they would scan all inbound and
outbound traffic, however doing so might create a bottleneck that
would impair the overall speed of the network.
• HIDS - Host Intrusion Detection Systems are run on individual hosts
or devices on the network. A HIDS monitors the inbound and out-
bound packets from the device only and will alert the user or admin-
istrator of suspicious activity is detected. A HIDS can also look for
malicious activity in the host itself, e.g., in the syslog file.
From the point of view of their detection strategy, IDSs are classically
classified in two classes:
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• Misuse detection [Ilgun et al., 1995, Lindqvist and Porras, 1999] uses
attack signatures to detect known attacks. If properly configured,
a misuse intrusion detection system generates a low rate of false
alarms but, on the other hand, does not recognize attacks that are
unknown when the signatures were generated (or, more precisely,
attacks/intrusions not described by the signatures).
• Anomaly detection is based on patterns of normal behavior, created
(typically) using an automated training process [Kruegel et al., 2005].
Deviations from this “normal behavior” are considered to be caused
by intrusions, so an intrusion can be detected without any previous
knowledge. Although anomaly detection overcomes misuse detec-
tion’s weaknesses, a high rate of false alarms is hampering of using
this type of detection mechanism.
2.3.1 Specification-based intrusion detection
Specification-based intrusion detection is a hybrid form of intrusion de-
tection that tries to combine the strengths of the previous two techniques:
misuse detection and anomaly detection. Instead of relying on machine
learning techniques, like anomaly detection, the specification-based ap-
proach [Balepin et al., 2003, Sekar et al., 2002, Uppuluri and Sekar, 2001] u-
ses manually developed specifications that craft legitimate system/proto-
col behaviors. A deviation from the specification is considered to be the
symptom of an intrusion. This solution has been applied to a few pro-
tocols and applications [Tseng et al., 2003, Orset et al., 2005], but never to
Ethernet protocols or STP, to the best of our knowledge.
In this approach, manually developed specifications are used to char-
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acterize legitimate protocol behaviour. As this method is based on legit-
imate behaviour, it does not generate false alarms when usual protocol
behaviour is encountered. Thus, its false positive rate can be comparable
to that of misuse detection. Since it detects attacks as deviation from legiti-
mate behaviour, it has the potential to detect previously unknown attacks.
[Tseng et al., 2003, Orset et al., 2005] proposed specification-based in-
trusion detection systems that can detect attacks on mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANET). The first paper introduced a specification that traces request-
reply flows to detect attacks on the AODV routing protocol, and the sec-
ond one proposed a specification of backward checking for the OLSR pro-
tocol. The major differences comparing to the thesis proposal, are the en-
vironment and the protocols studied. On a MANET, the most important
problem is blocking the entry of new malicious nodes in the network in-
frastructure, by using a forward address table to decide if an unknown
node is trusted. The specification is developed based on the forward ad-
dress tables mechanism. DoS attacks were not considered in these works.
The problem in this thesis is more complicated since as a legitimate NE is
able to behave incorrectly, simply checking the NE’s address is not enough
to mitigate the threats.
Chapter 3
Cooperative Intrusion Detection
System
The contents of this chapter were omitted due to the confidentiality
requirements. A brief summary of its contents is the following.
This thesis proposes a distributed intrusion detection system forCarrier
Ethernet networks. The proposal involves extending each NE with a net-
work intrusion detection software component. It is assumed that a subset
(unknown) of the NEs of a network can be compromised by hackers and
launch attacks against the network infrastructure. We say those NEs are
malicious, while the rest are correct. To make the assumption weaker, if a
NE is malicious, its network intrusion detection component can be com-
promised too, and give wrong information about detections. Therefore, a
subset of the NEs may not follow the correct specification of STP, and this
incorrect behavior has to be detected by the correct NEs/detectors.
This thesis uses specification-based intrusion detection, which detect at-
tacks as deviations from a norm. By specifying correct behavior, any other
behaviors will be classified as anomalous. The detector performs network
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intrusion detection in run-time. The specification of the STP protocol is
modeled using a state machine. The states of this machine are the states of
the protocol, and state transitions are caused by the reception of BPDUs or
expiration of timeouts.
The specification which represents the correct functionality of the pro-
tocol was manually developed. As the specification-based intrusion detec-
tion itself did not lead well with certain type of attacks, especially attacks
use timeout, therefore the mechanism was extended with annotations in
order to improve the detection of these particular cases.
A distributed correlation mechanism was also proposed in order to
detect cooperatively malicious NEs. The correlation information is ex-
changed between NEs and correlation done by each NE. To enhance the
information integrity, the existing DCN and Network Manager subsystem
were used for the authentication process.
Chapter 4
Evaluation
4.1 Implementation
The implementation was not done with real bridges/switches but us-
ing an emulator. The reasons against using real equipment were essen-
tially two: (1) using an emulator it is much simpler to test arbitrarily com-
plex networks, with as many NEs as needed; (2) although the insertion
of a detector inside a NE is quite feasible for its manufacturer, it is quite
challenging for end-users.
The emulator used was the RSTP simulator [Rozin, 2002]. Although it
is called “simulator”, it is really an emulator since it has components (pro-
cesses) that emulate a NEs, instead of using mathematical models of the
network and its components. The reason why we used an emulator of
RSTP, instead of an emulator of STP was that RSTP is the current stan-
dard, the most used nowadays and its protocol specification does not dif-
fer much from STP’s. Therefore, it proves the scalability of this solution
and its applicability of STP protocol’s variations.
The RSTP simulator is a full implementation of 802.1s done in C lan-
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guage, as a set of libraries and APIs. There are two types of processes:
bridge andmngr. The first is an emulation of a RSTP bridge and the second
is the environment, i.e., it allows to manage the topology, the communica-
tion between the NEs, and allows sending messages to the network.
The two programs use a few libraries. The bridge process is mostly
based on librstp.a that contains the implementation of RSTP. The library
libuid.a contains functions to process BPDUs, e.g., to extract/insert a BPDU
from/into a network message. The library libcli.a provides commands to
manage the network. For instance, it provides commands like link and
disconnect which allow the user to instantiate the network. There are also
tools to trace state machine transitions and to get information about net-
work modifications. Both programs show timestamps to allow the user
to understand when the commands were executed and when events have
taken place.
Each NE has locally a representation of the STP protocol specification,
which was manually insert into the original code of the RSTP simulator.
Each NE keeps for each of its neighbours information about its current
state (state name). Once it receives a message and if it is correct then it up-
dates its state. The time pattern values Rmaxe are configurable parameters
of the program.
For the correlation phase, the mngr’s source code and the communi-
cation channel with bridges were modified by adding code for the DCN
and the authentication mechanism. The detection information exchanged
between NEs has the following format [suspected NE id, last state NE de-
viated] and the SHA-1 hash function [NIST, 1994] was used to generate
ACK information. Additionally, the correlation period is also a config-
urable parameter. This period defines the duration for which a NE waits
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for ACKs from other NEs from the Network Manager and Authenticator.
In summary the configurable parameters are:
• Rmaxtimeout – timeout in the transition between the state Wait_for_-
CONF_BPDU and the state Wait_TCNA_BPDU
• Rmaxtcn – timeout for the send_TCN_BPDU events in state Wait_-
for_TCNA_BPDU
• Rmaxid – timeout for id changing of a NE
• CooperativePeriod – timeout for the period of a NE waiting for ACKs
from Network Manager and Authenticator
The source code of the emulator was modified to allow the injection of
all the attacks described in Section 2.2.7.
The emulation can be executed in one or more computers. Each NE
instance is executed as a single process of the operating system and the
processes communicated using UDP/IP. In the experiments all the pro-
cesses were run in the same machine. The test machine was a laptop with
a 2.1Ghz Centrino processor and Suse Linux 10.2.
4.2 Emulation of an Attack
This section presents an example of attack detection using the emula-
tion scenario. The scenario has only 3 NEs, for the screenshots to be as
simple and understandable as possible. However we still had to clean up
the pictures and add some comments for readability.
Figure 4.1 (top) presents a screenshot of the mngr process. When it
is executed, it becomes aware of the 3 NEs that are running, which are
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Figure 4.1: mngr (top) and malicious bridge (bottom)
internally numbered B4323, B4324 and B4325 (no relation with the bridge
ID). Then we executed three link commands to interconnect the 3 pairs of
ports of the NEs, forming a fully connected network with a loop.
On the bottom of the figure is a screenshot of the NE selected to be ma-
licious (bridge process). The command show bridge gives some information
about the NE. This is the NE with the lowest bridge ID so it is elected the
root bridge by RSTP. However, sometime later, at instant 17:31:36 the sleep
command is executed to make a silent attack. After that instant the NE
does not execute RSTP or forwards messages.
Figure 4.2 shows screenshots of the other two NEs, which are not ma-
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Figure 4.2: Correct bridges
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licious. On these two NEs, only a couple of show bridge commands were
executed. The timeout for the NEs to send a Configuration BPDU is by
default 2s, which is the value recommended by the standard. The mali-
cious NE went silent at 17:31:36, so approximately 2s later (17:33:24) both
correct NEs detected it did not send that BPDU, both decide they are the
root bridge, exchange some BPDUs, and end up agreeing that the root is
NE B4323 (the other writes that its port p04 is connected to the root).
When the timeout expires, the intrusion detectors in both NEs also sus-
pect that the malicious NE is indeed malicious. However the attack at
this stage is indistinguishable from a real failure of the NE, like a crash or
power disconnection. Therefore, the two correct NEs do nothing about it.
However, the malicious NE goes on running again and becoming the root,
then becoming silent again repeatedly, causing frequent reconfigurations
of the network (this is not displayed in the screenshots, though). Recall
that the timeout transition is annotated with a maximum number of repe-
titions Rmaxtimeout . Therefore, after Rmaxtimeout repetitions of this cycle both
correct NEs decide that the malicious NE is indeed malicious, exchange
information about this sending ACKs to the authenticator, disconnect the
malicious NE permanently.
4.3 Severity of Attacks
This section evaluates the severity of the attacks using the emulation
environment. The two attack injection scenarios, now with more NEs, are
shown in Figures 4.3. In the scenario 1, there is only one malicious NE,
in the middle of the topology, and in the scenario 2 there are 5 malicious
NEs.
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Correct NE
Malicious NE
Attack scenario 1
Attack scenario 2
Figure 4.3: Attack Scenarios
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Attack Result Severity Effects
ID changing attacks Successful CT network completely
unavailable
Silent attacks Successful CT network completely
unavailable
Faked failure attacks Successful CR partial network
reconfiguration
BPDU flooding attacks Successful CR small amount of traffic
flooding
Invalid BPDU Unsuccessful MN no effect
Table 4.1: Evaluation of the attacks in scenario 1 (1 malicious NE)
All the identified attacks were tested in the two scenarios. Tables 4.1
and 4.2 show an evaluation of the severity of these attacks against RSTP.
The attacks are categorized into the five ISO categories [ISO, 2002]: CT
(catastrophic: >0.95), CR (critical: >0.75), MG (marginal: >0.5) and MN
(minor: >0.25). The highest value represents the highest severity or im-
pact. The values were given manually by us, watching the consequences
to the network of each attack.
The experiments allowed us to conclude that the ID changing and the
silent attacks are the two most dangerous threats to the protocol. To achie-
ve a catastrophic denial of service in the network, a malicious NE has to
be close to the root of the tree in the topology. However, if the attacker is
far from the root, it can first do an ID changing attack to become the root
bridge, or at least a designated bridge to some link or set of links. After be-
ing the root bridge or a designated bridge, other attacks become easier. At
that stage, silent attacks are the most critical, since even a single malicious
NE –scenario 1– can force the reconfiguration of the tree periodically, pre-
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venting the communication altogether or at least delaying it with constant
needs for retransmissions.
In the case of faked failure attacks and BPDU flooding attacks, the ef-
fects were not so disruptive. These attack are much more critical when
performed by a set of malicious NEs (scenario 2). This is the reason why
they are marked CT in Table 4.2 but only CR in Table 4.1.
Interestingly, in the both scenarios the Invalid BPDU attack failed be-
cause the NEs discarded the BPDUs with invalid fields. This was true for
the NE provided with the emulator, and for the limited number of mal-
formed messages tested, but it is not necessarily true for all NEs currently
available or with all possible malformed messages.
Attack Result Severity Effects
ID changing attacks Successful CT network completely
unavailable
Silent attacks Successful CT network completely
unavailable
Faked failure attacks Successful CT frequent network
reconfiguration
BPDU flooding attacks Successful CT network completely
unavailable
Invalid BPDU Unsuccessful MN no effect
Table 4.2: Evaluation of the attacks in scenario 2 (5 malicious NE)
4.4 Intrusion Detection Evaluation
Besides the previous experiments, an evaluation of the intrusion de-
tection was also performed. As mentioned in Section 4.1, the code of the
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two programs mngr and bridge was modified to include not only the local
detection functionality but also the correlation mechanism, emulating the
DCN and the authentication mechanism specified in the thesis.
Malicious NE
Correct NE
t = 3, m = 1
t = 4, m = 1
t = 5, m = 1
t = 5, m = 2
Figure 4.4: IDS Evaluation Scenarios
The evaluation of IDSs is known to be a complex problem, since the
number of possible attacks is immense and the performance of each IDS
is much affected by too many parameters, like the throughput and the
particular variation of some attacks [Lippmann et al., 2000]. However, the
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IDS scheme proposed in this thesis is different because the number of pos-
sible attacks is small and known (see Section 2.2.7). Therefore, we used
the emulation environment to emulate all these attacks and all were ef-
fectively detected (no false negatives). There were also no false positives,
i.e., nothing detected to be an attack which was not really an attack. There
are some cases in which accidental faults like the intermittent failure and
recovery of a NE may be mistakingly detected as an attack, but this is not
particularly serious since it is indeed a problem that has to be corrected,
independently of its origin not being malicious.
ID Changing Attacks
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Figure 4.5: Evaluation of the IDS with ID Changing Attacks
After this evaluation in terms of ability to detect attacks, several exper-
iments were made to evaluate the performance of the IDS implemented.
Here the results of the evaluation for the two most critical attacks – ID
Changing Attack and Silent Attack – are presented.
Several evaluation scenarios were considered (see Figure 4.4). These
scenarios were defined in terms of two parameters: t, the total number of
NEs in the network, and m, the number of malicious NEs. The yy axis indi-
cates the average time for a NE to detect malicious activity, and the xx axis
gives the different evaluation scenarios. All the NEs tested were run in the
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Silent Attacks
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Figure 4.6: Evaluation of the IDS with Silent Attacks
same machine, although the simulator also allows the execution in a LAN.
The timeouts were set to 5 seconds, the CooperativePeriod parameter was
set to 10 seconds, and the parameters Rmaxe were set to 2. Each evaluation
process began with a malicious NE starting an attack and ended when a
malicious NE was identified. Each NE obtains the evaluation time locally
and the time values presented in the graphics are average values of all the
measurement obtained by the NEs.
The results of the experiments are shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.5. Some
conclusions of the experiments results are the following:
• The detection of ID Changing Attacks was faster than the detection
of Silent Attacks. The main reason for this result is that detecting
ID Changing Attacks does not require cooperative intrusion detec-
tion: each NE can detect locally the attack by using the number of
repetition of identification of a NE (configurable parameter, 2 in this
case). For detecting Silent Attacks, the cooperative intrusion detec-
tion scheme has to wait for ACKs coming from the DCN, and the
CooperativePeriod parameter was set to 10 seconds, so the times are
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larger than this.
• The complexity of network topology has a strong influence on the
cooperative intrusion detection stage.
• The position of the malicious NE on the network also has influence
on the performance.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Conclusion
The thesis presents the design of a novel system for protecting Carrier
Ethernet networks from attacks performed by their own NEs. Each NE
is equipped with a specification-based intrusion detection system, which
locally detects the malicious behaviour of other NEs against STP and its
variations. The results from the local detection are later exchanged and
correlated between NEs. The correlation is done by each NE locally, per-
miting the identification of malicious NEs.
The specification which represents the correct operation of the protocol
wasmanually developed based on the standard. After a preliminary study
of the attacks and the STP protocol characteristics, it was concluded that
the specification-based intrusion detection itself did not deal well with cer-
tain type of events (e.g., timeout), therefore the mechanism was extended
with annotations in order to detect all known attacks against STP.
In the correlation stage, a distributed correlation mechanism was pro-
posed. Instead of the single point of decision, correlation information is
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exchanged between NEs and correlation is done by each NE. To enhance
the information integrity, the existing DCN andNetworkManager subsys-
tems were used. These two components are not an addition to the current
Carrier Ethernet architecture, since they are often deployed.
The solution was implemented and tested using an emulator of RSTP.
The emulator wasmodified to allow the injection of attacks on the network
and to provide the proposed intrusion detection mechanism. Several eval-
uations were done, including attack injection tests, and the solution per-
formance evaluation. All analysed attacks were successfully injected in
the network, but a subset of them were more critical independently of the
network topology. In relation to the solution performance evaluation, the
results showed that it did not bring a great impact in terms of network
bandwidth consumption and can be done fast enough for practical pur-
poses.
5.2 Future Work
There is a set of attacks that can be performed bymalicious NEs that are
very similar to those that can be done by malicious routers. Examples in-
clude forwarding messages to the wrong link or discarding messages. As
future work, we intend to do research on how to deal with these attacks.
They were not considered yet because the solutions might be similar to
those used to deal with malicious routers, an area about which there is a
large literature, since the seminal work by Perlman [Perlman, 1988].
The implementation of the present solution was done using a simula-
tor. It will be interesting to test the system in a real environment, which
means inserting the code in existing NEs and evaluate in real-time the per-
5.2. FUTURE WORK 47
formance and impact for the network.
The same detectionmechanism can be also adapted for other layer pro-
tocols. Until now, the solution only accepts a manually crafted protocol
specification. A future work can be an automation of the protocol speci-
fication development process and to allow more than one specification in
the same detector.
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